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Abstract. Climate policy uncertainty significantly hinders investments in low-carbon technologies, 
and the global community is behind schedule to curb carbon emissions. Strong actions will be 
necessary to limit the increase in global temperatures, and continued delays create risks of escalating 
climate change damages and future policy costs.  These risks are system-wide, long-term and large-
scale and thus hard to diversify across firms.  Because of its unique scale, cost structure, and near-
term availability, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) has a significant 
 
 
potential to help manage climate policy risks and facilitate the transition to lower greenhouse gas 
emissions.  ‘Call’ options contracts in the form of the right but not the obligation to buy high-quality 
emissions reduction credits from jurisdictional REDD+ programs at a predetermined price per ton of 
CO2 could help unlock this potential despite the current lack of carbon markets that accept REDD+ for 
compliance.  This approach could provide a globally important cost-containment mechanism and 
insurance for firms against higher future carbon prices, while channeling finance to avoid 
deforestation until policy uncertainties decline and carbon markets scale up. 
Key policy insights: 
x Climate policy uncertainty discourages abatement investments and hampers demand for 
mitigation in general,  exposing firms to an escalating systemic risk of  future rapid increases 
in emission control expenditures;  
x This situation poses a risk of an abatement ‘short squeeze,’ paralleling the case in financial 
markets when prices jump sharply as investors rush to square accounts on a widely ‘shorted’ 
investment, one they have bet against and promised to repay later in anticipation of falling 
prices. 
x There is likely to be a willingness to pay for mechanisms that hedge the risks of abruptly 
rising carbon prices, in particular for ‘call’ options, the right but not the obligation to buy 
high-quality emissions reduction credits at a predetermined price, due to the significantly 
lower upfront capital expenditure compared to other hedging alternatives. 
x Establishing rules as soon as possible for compliance market acceptance of high-quality 
emissions reductions credits from REDD+ would facilitate REDD+ transactions, including via 
options-based contracts, which could help fill the gap of uncertain climate policies and 
incipient carbon markets in the short and medium term. 
x Options on emissions reductions from REDD+ could unlock private capital and create a 
sizable emissions reductions pool that could mitigate large future adjustment costs for 
 
 
business and society while channeling investments for climate mitigation, forest 
conservation, and green growth in tropical developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
The move towards a more bottom-up global climate policy approach, based on voluntary 
contributions, as embodied in the Paris Agreement of 2015 carries both a threat and an opportunity. 
There is a threat because current emissions reduction pledges are not ambitious enough, and we are 
already late with mitigation (Fawcett et al.  2015, Millar et al 2017).  There is an opportunity because 
the decentralized approach is spurring worldwide pledges and carbon pricing policy developments that 
could help increase ambition over time (World Bank, Ecofys and Vivid Economics 2016; EDF and IETA 
2016).  Moreover, the opportunity for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation 
(REDD+), which was uniquely singled out within the Paris Agreement, could provide relatively low-cost 
emissions reductions on a large scale to help enhance mitigation ambition as countries work to achieve 
their pledges and tighten them over time.  
REDD+ could provide three important contributions in shaping the global greenhouse gas emissions 
profile. First, it could reduce long-term emission reduction costs, providing about 10%-50% of required 
abatement by mid-century and offering a channel for emerging countries to participate in carbon 
trading, raising more finance to support their national strategies (Bosetti et al 2011; Lubowski and Rose 
2013). Second, it could provide a “reserve” to accommodate future adjustments to lower emissions 
targets, thereby reducing the mid-term cost of switching abatement pathways (Golub et al. 2017; 
Houghton et al., 2015; Golub 2010).  As the window of opportunity narrows to avoid dangerous 
increases in global temperatures, such a buffer is needed to keep the option open to meet more 
ambitious emissions reduction goals in the future.  REDD+ could contribute to this buffer and at the 
same time generate additional co-benefits from forest conservation.  Finally, well-structured market 
policies that allow access to low-cost near-term mitigation options such as REDD+ provide greater 
flexibility for longer-term investments into research and development (R&D) that can yield improved 
technologies in the future; this technological progress will be critical for ensuring a dynamically 
efficient pathway of decarbonization (Koch et al. 2017; Szolgayova et al. 2014). 
 
 
The drivers of deforestation are complex and include economic incentives for land-use change (e.g., 
converting forests into agricultural land) weak institutions (e.g., lack of law enforcement, unsettled 
property rights, corruption) and scant economic incentives to protect and restore forests and the 
carbon they contain.   Nevertheless, there is already evidence on the ground that large-scale 
deforestation can be stopped when the right conditions are in place. Improved satellite monitoring 
and remote sensing technologies, tougher law enforcement, and a suite of policies have already helped 
reduce average deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon by two thirds, relative to 1996-2005 levels, 
making Brazil the world leader in greenhouse gas reductions (INPE 2017; Nepstad et al. 2014).  
Maintaining and extending the gains made so far will depend on durable policies that reward forest 
protection at a landscape scale. As a necessary but not sufficient condition to avert tropical 
deforestation, there must be a way for forest landowners, communities, and governments to realize 
at least some of the value of thriving forests.  Including carbon credits for emissions reductions from 
jurisdictional (national or state-level) REDD+ within compliance carbon markets could play a central 
role in realizing this vision by unlocking private finance for a wide range of reforms, enforcement, and 
incentive  programmes at the scale and durability needed for meaningful forest protection.   
All of the necessary conditions for a large-scale international forest carbon market do not yet exist.  
However, there are signs that they are coming into place.   In 2013, Parties to the United Nations 
Framework for Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, which 
addressed technical issues for national REDD+ programmes.  Furthermore, the Paris Agreement 
explicitly affirmed the central role of REDD+ as a mitigation tool and called on countries to sacle up 
results-based payments.   In addition, the Paris Agreement broadly recongized the role for 
international cooperation in increasing mitigation ambition.  Although REDD+ is not included in any 
compliance carbon markets at the moment, REDD+ is the most popular credit type in the voluntary 
carbon market (Hamrick and Gallant 2017), and several compliance markets have the potential to 
accept jurisdiciotnal REDD+ over the next 3-5 yuears.  These markets include California and South 
Korea, which allow for the limitied  use of international credits for compliance, though the necessary 
 
 
regulations are still pending, and the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation (CORSIA) under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).   Under current levels of 
participation, this aviation market is estimated to require, on a cumulative basis, at least 110 million 
tons of offset credits through 2020, 350 million tons through 2025, and 2.5 billion tons of carbon-
dioxide equivalent (CO2e) through 2035 to fulfill its mandate of capping global aviation emissions at 
2020 levels (EDF 2016).   On the supply side, the pipeline of jurisdictional-scale REDD+ credits is 
estimated to be 157-167 million tons of CO2e over 2016-2020 and about 1.3 to 1.5 billion tons over 
the following 5 years, depending on the participation of Brazil (Grillo et al. 2016).   While conditions 
are thus potentially ripe for a REDD+ market, there remain significant institutional and policy barriers 
to implementing REDD+ at large scales and for emerging carbon markets to help tap this potential 
(see, for example,  Brockhaus et al. 2017; see Lubowski and Rose 2013 for a review). 
In this paper, we pull together insights from recent literature on the economics of climate change that 
highlights the impact of regulatory uncertainties and identifies financial tools and approaches to help 
manage these risks.   We build our policy analysis upon a macroeconomic analysis of the potential role 
of REDD+ in emerging carbon markets presented in Golub et al. (2017).  Starting from this broader 
economic perspective, we analyze the significant financial risks facing greenhouse-gas-emitting firms 
and the potential financial and policy solutions for private companies to use REDD+ to manage these 
risks.  In particular, we argue that enabling options-based transactions could minimize risks for both 
REDD+ buyers and sellers, help smooth the transition to future climate policies, and unlock important 
emissions reductions that can accelerate climate action in the context of significant policy 
uncertainties.  
In the next section, we discuss how regulatory uncertainty currently suppresses the demand for 
emissions reductions, including REDD+.  In section 3, we introduce a new concept of an “abatement 
short squeeze” and explain how using ‘call’ option contracts--granting the right but not the obligation 
to buy--on demonstrated emissions reductions from REDD+ offers a promising strategy to mitigate the 
 
 
cost of policy uncertainty for business and society.  The last section summarizes and offers policy 
recommendations.  
2. Regulatory uncertainty suppresses demand for abatement 
Parties considering a potential carbon market transaction need to make irreversible decisions in an 
uncertain economic and policy environment. Golub et al. (2017) explain how regulatory uncertainty 
discourages the accumulation (‘banking’) of emission allowances for use in future periods and 
therefore suppresses the current price.  Empirical analysis supports this theoretical conclusion.  The 
low carbon prices persisting under the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) have been 
widely attributed to an oversupply of allowances due to the economic recession and overlapping 
policies supporting renewables, together with large availability of low-cost international credits.  
Through an econometric analysis, Koch et al. (2014) show that negative price changes in the EU-ETS  
are indeed been associated with economic activity, renewables policies and costs of fuel switching. 
However, the explanatory power of these factors is just 10%, and the balance can be attributed to 
regulatory uncertainty, particularly related to policy efforts to strengthen the EU ETS.1  Market 
participants learned about the difficulty of policy reform processes, translating into decreased 
confidence in the future stringency of the cap and in the associated price of allowances (Koch et al., 
2016).  
Furthermore, investments in REDD+ are subject to specific regulatory uncertainty since its recognition 
within compliance carbon markets is not certain (Goldstein and Ruef 2016). This uncertainty over the 
future “fungibility” of REDD+ is a key reason why private sector actors are discounting the value of 
REDD+.  A survey and set of interviews with private sector stakeholders conducted by Laing et al. (2015; 
2016) confirms that uncertainty about future compliance market eligibility is the major factor holding 
back further demand for REDD+ credits (Goldstein and Ruef 2016. Lee et al. 2017).  
                                                          
1 In a subsequent study, Koch et al. (2016) examine the response of allowance prices to regulatory news 
regarding the supply of allowances in the EU ETS. Based on an event study method, they quantify the price 
response to news announcements about the time profile of EU ETS supply schedules between 2008 and 2014. 
 
 
Regulatory uncertainty thus discourages banking of emissions allowances as well as of REDD+ and 
other emissions reduction credits. In the short run, with limited banking, emerging carbon markets will 
experience so-called “oversupply” and low spot prices for carbon.  However, over the long term, 
society will end up caught short on abatement opportunities as myopic extrapolation of those low 
prices discourages both banking of emission units and deployment of new abatement technologies. In 
the next section, we demonstrate how such behaviour can lead to an eventual  ‘short squeeze’ on 
abatement at a system-wide level and how call options on REDD+ credits could help mitigate the 
shortcomings of current climate policy. 
 
3. Call options on REDD+ and other cost-effective emissions reductions could help 
manage policy risks 
While uncertainty over long-term climate policies discourages near-term investments to reduce 
emissions, if firms leave it at that, future policy risks will be unhedged.  If a jurisdiction or sector 
eventually implements stringent climate policy, regulated emitters that have deferred investments will 
have limited abatement possibilities, leading to a potential spike in expenditures on emission controls.  
Using financial terminology, we call this situation an abatement ‘short squeeze,’ as it parallels the case 
in financial markets when prices jump sharply as investors rush to square accounts on a widely 
‘shorted’ investment, one they have bet against and promised to repay later in anticipation of falling 
prices.   
As an example, Table 1 presents a simplified event tree, which depicts a two-period decision problem 
for an emissions-intensive firm.  In period 1, the firm can choose to make an investment to abate a 
certain amount of emissions and at least delay their possibility until period 2. The three columns to the 
right in Table 1 describe the different outcomes depending on society’s selection in period 2 of a policy 
to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at either 450 or 550 parts per million 
(ppm) of CO2e.  (This global-scale target is shown for illustration only but, in reality, relevant policies 
 
 
for firms will likely be selected at the level of national or subnational governments.)  Accelerated 
abatement in the first period provides a reserve or buffer of emissions reductions that could be fully 
or partially used to reduce the future cost of climate policy if the more stringent 450 ppm target is 
selected or, alternatively, simply abandoned in the case of a weaker target.   
Table 1:  Reserve accumulation and policy adjustment 
Selection in the 
first period 
Selection of 
policy in the 
second period 
Reduction of 
abatement cost as 
a result of 
innovations 
Cost of 
permanent 
deferral of 
emissions 
Use of reserve 
Abatement and 
deferred 
emissions 
 
450 ppm 
Modest learning 
(high cost) 
High High 
Low Maximum 
Significant 
learning (low cost) 
High Medium 
Low High 
550 ppm 
Modest learning 
(high cost) 
High Medium 
Low High 
Significant 
learning (low cost) 
High Low  
Low Medium 
  
 
Our analysis suggests that a firm with a potential abatement liability should consider managing its risks 
of sudden cost shocks in response to future climate policies. There are several ways to reduce such risk 
exposure: (I) avoiding new high-carbon investments, (ii) investing into abatement to decarbonize 
production, (iii) banking allowances or emission reduction credits, and (iv) buying a call option on 
carbon allowances or credits.  The first alternative is relatively no-regret, since the investment could 
potentially be initiated later, while the second and third alternatives require upfront capital investment 
whose value could be at risk if the returns rely on future carbon prices being above a certain level.  In 
contrast, a call option would give the buyer the right but not the obligation to buy an allowance or 
credit at a pre-determined purchase (‘strike’) price at a future date.   Call options would of course also 
 
 
lose value with low prices, but the losses would be limited to the value of the upfront (‘premium’) 
payment to purchase the option.  
All firms in a given climate policy jurisdiction essentially face the same climate policy risk, and risks are 
likely to be correlated globally to some extent.  This makes it difficult to diversify this policy risk across 
the potentially exposed firms.  Similarly, policy risks are typically hard to insure directly through typical 
financial and insurance markets. Long-dated carbon price insurance products are not currently 
available at large scale and low cost.   As a result, firms have limited tools to hedge long-term carbon 
emission prices via existing carbon markets and associated futures or other derivatives.  
Golub et al. (2017) estimate that over the next fifteen years, reduced deforestation and forest 
degradation has the potential to contribute up to 20 gigatons (Gt) CO2e of tradable emissions 
reductions, about half of which could be cost-effectively financed via options-based contracts.  Even if 
this potential is only realized partially, such contracts could equip industry with a vitally important 
abatement reserve that can help avoid an abatement short squeeze.  
Within a carbon market system, simple direct purchases and banking of allowances and credits could 
be a solution for firms to manage their policy risks, if these units were available at a large discount to 
the future market price.  An attractive price for buyers would equal the marginal expected value of 
emissions units (i.e. forward price) adjusted for the investment risk, but suppliers may not be willing 
to accept such a low price.  A potential solution for both buyers and sellers is to structure call option 
contracts with a strike price high enough to cover the expected opportunity cost of avoided 
deforestation or other near-term, cost-effective abatement options.  Call options on REDD+ and call 
options on reductions of industrial emissions (emission allowances) are critically different in terms of 
their potential costs and scale.   
Entering into a call options contract, a seller should have a plan on how to deliver emission reductions 
in case the buyer chooses to exercise the contract.  Options backed up (‘covered’) by actual emissions 
reductions, already achieved and demonstrated via rigorous emissions reduction monitoring, 
 
 
reporting, and verification protocols, would have the most credibility and help manage risks associated 
with the delivery and potential non-performance of abatement efforts.   In providing a call option 
backed up by actual reductions in energy or industrial emissions, the seller should simultaneously 
invest into abatement, which may be capital intensive, essentially making the irreversible decision to 
abate.  On the other hand, the cost of reducing deforestation to keep open an option on the associated 
reductions is based on the initial incremental costs of instituting forest protection and rural 
development programs (relative to the costs of investment in deforestation-based development), 
along with the recurring costs of managing these programs.   Society also likely faces the potential of  
foregone net revenues from agriculture or other alternative land uses over the time that the option to 
delay deforestation is preserved.  Compared to investments in abatement in fossil-energy and 
industrial sectors, this cost structure of avoiding deforestation is likely to be less frontloaded, with 
fewer and smaller initial investments and more recurring investments (e.g. to pay for ongoing law 
enforcement and monitoring efforts and compensate landowners and communities for forest 
conservation).   This makes REDD+ programs a promising source of call options.   
Based on the estimated cost-effectiveness and scale of REDD+, there is potential for a significant 
economic surplus in transactions to hedge a possible shortfall on energy and industrial abatement with 
an investment in demonstrated REDD+ outcomes.    Form the suppliers’ perspective, in order to sell an 
option backed up by actual forest protection, tropical forest regions will need to refrain from 
ideforesting at least until the option contract expires.   This decision potentially has  limited irreversible 
upfront costs, as described above.  Forested regions also have an option value related to their potential 
future carbon value.  Accounting for the value of this option, in addition to all the other local benefits 
that forest ecosystems provide, the economic value of immediate deforestation could be negative in 
most cases (e.g. Engel et al. 2015).  If this decision could be made financially viable, it would thus be 
rational for the land manager or policy maker to defer deforestation until major uncertainties 
regarding carbon markets and relative returns in the agricultural sector are resolved. 
 
 
From the perspective of potential call options buyers, different firms may have different preferences 
regarding both strike price and level of upfront payment for an option on future abatement from 
REDD+ or other sources. The Foster-Hart (2009) risk metric is a useful tool to understand the 
preferences of heterogeneous firms over potential strike prices, upfront payments and exposure to 
regulatory risk in the climate policy context.  This metric links the choice over a risky decision (‘gamble’) 
to the level of “critical wealth,“ defined as a bottom line a company may not afford to go below.  If 
such a decision creates the risk of  a result that could potentially reduce wealth below this threshold, 
then the decision-maker should reject this choice.  For a firm, Foster and Hart (2009) define this 
threshold as the point of bankruptcy, but it could also be a critical level of debt-to-equity, earnings per 
share or other indicator of the firm’s financial performance.  The concept of critical wealth establishes 
an objective criterion for evaluating decisions based on their potential outcomes.  The Forest-Hart 
metric thus helps understand why different firms, even with identical preferences, may tolerate 
different levels of risk and choose different hedging strategies according to their financial status.  
Consider an example where a firm has a critical wealth threshold ଴ܹ and faces the choice to invest in 
a reserve of emissions allowances ܴ଴, paying a price of $40/tCO2, in anticipation of a future carbon 
market liability.  However, the future price could drop to $20/tCO2 or rise to $70/tCO2. As a result, by 
building a reserve of allowances, the firm could suffer losses of̈́ʹͲܴ଴ (the over-payment in the case 
the price falls to $20/tCO2), ignoring for simplicity any cost of capital.   Alternatively, by deferring this 
investment, the firm could face a potential cost increase of̈́͵Ͳܴ଴ if it misses the opportunity to pay 
$40/tCO2 and the price then rises to $70/tCO2.  If the firm can tolerate losses up to ଴ܹ ൐ ̈́͵Ͳܴ଴, then 
either gamble -- banking allowances or deferring abatement- - is in minimally acceptable.  However, 
if ଴ܹ ൏ ̈́ʹͲܴ଴, then neither gamble is acceptable under the Foster-Hard criterion.  
Options on REDD+ or other cost-effective sources of high quality abatement provide a tool for 
engineering the firm’s risk-return prospects in such a situation.  In the example above, if the firm can 
buy a ‘call’ option that locks in the right to buy credits at the current price of $40/tCO2 (i.e. an ‘at-the-
money’ call option) and this costs $5/tCO2, then the firm’s maximum losses are capped at ̈́ͷܴ଴, what 
 
 
it paid for the insurance provided by the options.  As long as ଴ܹ ൐ ̈́ͷܴ଴, the firm can afford this 
modified gamble. Given values for  ଴ܹ and ܴ଴, the firm could be willing to pay up to ሺ ෠ܲ ൅ ݌௖௔௟௟ሻܴ଴ ൌ
 ଴ܹ to cover its future liability, where ݌௖௔௟௟ is the upfront cost (premium) to buy the call option and  ෠ܲ 
is the maximum acceptable level of the ‘strike’ price associated with that premium (the pre-
determined price the firm would need to pay to buy the credit if the option were exercised). 
Rearranging this equality equation, the maximum acceptable strike price can be defined as  ෠ܲ ൌ ௐబோబ െ
݌௖௔௟௟.  
This application of the Foster-Hart risk metric provides a structure for evaluating the potential for firms 
to demand call options on REDD+ credits and other cost-effective types of abatement.   The upfront 
price needed to cover the costs of REDD+ in the near term may be low.  However,  given unknown 
future agricultural opportunity costs, as well as the need of tropical countries to achieve and use some 
of their emissions reductions for meeting their own domestic emission reduction pledges, notably their 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, the negotiated strike price 
may need to be relatively high.  With a relatively high future purchase price, sellers also retain the 
ability to sell credits on the market directly if a REDD+ market materializes but actual carbon prices 
turn out below the strike price.  A benefit-sharing arrangement based on the ultimate market price 
(Krasovskii et al., 2016a, 2016b) or an indexed annual payment (Engel et al. 2015) could also provide 
more attractive alternatives to a fixed strike price.  
 
4. Discussion and conclusions  
How are companies hedging climate policy uncertainties?  Intuitively, they would try to avoid long-
term irreversible investment decisions in carbon-intensive assets, assigning an indicative price to 
associated carbon emissions.  Internal carbon prices used by companies already enable the assessment 
of important decisions that could lock companies into a particular carbon emissions trajectory. Over 
400 companies worldwide reported using an internal price on carbon in 2015, up from 150 in 2014 
 
 
(CDP 2016).  This is at least consistent with firms’ anticipation of the potential for stricter climate policy.  
Internal carbon prices that vary across entities can also be interpreted as a subjective valuation of the 
foregone option value associated with carbon-intensive decisions.  Nevertheless, simply avoiding 
locking into new high-carbon investments may not provide sufficient flexibility in case of a sharp future 
adjustment of climate policy.  
Options on REDD+ credits provide an added way to enhance flexibility.  Policy risk is a system-wide 
risk, which is hard to diversify across firms such that firms underinvest on abatement in the aggregate, 
relative to an ideal case without uncertainty.  On the other hand, the optionality of deferring  
investments to convert tropical forests to agriculture works in the opposite direction, creating a value 
to delaying emissions in anticipation of potential future carbon values.  Because of its unique scale, 
cost structure, and potential near-term availability, REDD+ has a significant potential to facilitate the 
transition to a low-carbon emissions pathway and enable the adjustment to more ambitious future 
global climate policies.   
The rationale put forth in this paper is that there is likely to be a willingness to pay (and accept) to keep 
open the option of accessing low-cost REDD+ credits that could be valid for compliance.  Even if 
business is sceptical about carbon markets and unsure about the recognition of REDD+, a modest 
upfront payment for an option that might or might not be exercised against a certain strike price at a 
later point in time could be an attractive hedge against the risk of tighter future emission limits.   
Delaying deforestation and selling options on emissions reductions achieved via REDD+ could also 
make sense from the perspective of the seller countries, if the strike price is sufficiently high. 
Given the potential costs and volumes, options on REDD+ could make an important contribution to 
firms’ risk management portfolios.  Such options could provide firms with a hedge against uncertain 
costs due to both policy and technological uncertainties (Fuss et al., 2011).   Modeling by Szolgayova 
et al. (2014) suggests that if firms have the ability to invest into REDD+ options alongside uncertain 
R&D of low-carbon technologies, their benefits are increased.  This is because the hedge provided by 
 
 
the options creates additional flexibility for making R&D investments that could pay off over the longer 
term while still ensuring compliance with emissions limits over the nearer term. 
If climate policy tightens, REDD+ will be increasingly likely to form part of compliance market systems, 
given pressure for cost-effectiveness.  This will increase the potential that call options on REDD+ will 
have hedging value for emitting industries.  Nevertheless, given the nascent stage of international 
carbon markets and regulatory uncertainties about future market rules, REDD+ credits remain an 
imperfect hedge against future climate policies for individual firms.    
Stronger signals of long-term climate policy ambition would help build confidence for low-carbon 
investments across all sectors.  In parallel, policy makers can help unlock the potential value of REDD+ 
as a cost-effective mitigation option and hedge against policy risks by providing certainty over 
recognition of high-quality REDD+ credits within existing and emerging compliance markets.  Careful 
policy designs in terms of use of REDD+ options and quotas and price floors also merit consideration 
to minimize the potential “crowding out” of clean energy investments (Koch et al. 2017).   
A critical start would be for policy makers and stakeholders to support efforts to codify and build 
consensus around market standards for high-quality jurisdictional REDD+ credits, consistent with the 
Warsaw Framework for REDD+ and the Paris Agreement.  Additional efforts should focus on 
establishing registries and other market infrastructure for high-integrity REDD+ transactions, with 
robust benefit-sharing arrangements.  Furthermore, companies and governments could support pilot 
transactions of call options on verified REDD+ credits using a blend of public and private capital to 
provide proof-of-concept and catalyze larger efforts.  For example, a blended-finance vehicle to 
aggregate and channel potential buyers and sellers could help facilitate the development of a 
compliance carbon market for REDD+ credits and options (EDF and CFC 2018).   Public and 
philanthropic donors could catalyze such structures with price guarantees (‘put’ options) to tropical 
countries and potential investors to ensure a minimum price for REDD+.  These efforts could unleash 
the potential of well-structured REDD+ contracts to reduce policy risks for both the private sector and 
 
 
tropical nations, while mobilizing finance to significantly address climate change and protect forests as 
policy uncertainties decline and carbon markets scale up.   
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